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Abstract:Mobile ad-hoc networking works properly only if the participating nodes cooperate in routing
and forwarding. However, it may be advantageous for individual nodes not to cooperate. We propose a
protocol, called CONFIDANT, for making misbehavior unattractive; it is based on selective altruism and
utilitarianism. It aims at detecting and isolating misbehaving nodes, thus making it unattractive to deny
cooperation. Trust relationships and routing decisions are based on experienced, observed, or reported
routing and forwarding behavior of other nodes. The detailed implementation of CONFIDANT in this
paper assumes that the network layer is based on the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol. We
present a performance analysis of DSR fortified by CONFIDANT and compare it to regular defenseless
DSR. It shows that a network with CONFIDANT and up to 60% of misbehaving nodes behaves almost
as well as a benign network, in sharp contrast to a defenseless network. All simulations have been
implemented and performed in GloMoSim.
1 Introduction
The CONFIDANT protocol works as an extension
to a reactive source-routing protocol for mobile ad-
hoc networks. For the simulation implementation,
we have chosen Dynamic Source Routing (DSR)
as the base protocol. In the following subsections
we briefly describe what we need to know of DSR,
describe the attacks we support, and specify how
we want to thwart them.
1.1 Background: the DSR Protocol
Dynamic Source Routing is a protocol developed
for routing in mobile ad-hoc networks and was pro-
posed for MANET by Broch, Johnson and Maltz
[JM99]. In a nutshell, it works as follows: Nodes
send out a ROUTE REQUEST message, all nodes
that receive this message forward it to their neigh-
bors and put themselves into the source route un-
less they have received the same request before.
If a receiving node is the destination, or has a
route to the destination, it does not forward the re-
quest, but sends a REPLY message containing the
full source route. It may send that reply along the
source router in reverse order or issue a ROUTE
REQUEST including the route to get back to the
source, if the former is not possible due to asym-
metric links. ROUTE REPLY messages can be trig-
gered by ROUTE REQUEST messages or gratu-
itous. After receiving one or several routes, the
source picks the best (by default the shortest),
stores it, and sends messages along that path. In
general, the better the route metrics (number of
hops, delay, bandwidth or other criteria) and the
sooner the REPLY arrived at the source (indication
of a short path - the nodes are required to wait a
time corresponding to the length of the route they
can advertise before sending it in order to avoid a
storm of replies), the higher preference is given to
the route and the longer it will stay in the cache.
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In case of a link failure, the node that cannot for-
ward the packet to the next node sends an error
message towards the source. Routes that contain a
failed link, can be ‘salvaged’ by taking an alternate
partial route that does not contain the bad link.
1.2 Attacks against routing
The lack of infrastructure and organizational envi-
ronment of mobile ad-hoc networks offer special op-
portunities to attackers. Without proper security, it
is possible to gain various advantages by malicious
behavior: better service than cooperating nodes,
monetary benefits by exploiting incentive measures
or trading confidential information; saving power
by selfish behavior, preventing someone else from
getting proper service, extracting data to get con-
fidential information, and so on.
Several routing and forwarding attacks on DSR
have been described in [BB02]. We aim at protec-
tion against the following types of misbehavior.
o No forwarding (of control messages or data).
o Unusual traffic attraction (advertises many ex-
cellent routes or advertises routes very rapidly,
so they are deemed good routes).
o Route salvaging, i.e., rerouting to avoid a bro-
ken link, although no error has been observed.
o Lack of error messages, although an error has
been observed.
o Unusually frequent route updates.
o Silent route change (tampering with the mes-
sage header of either control or data packets).
1.3 Thwarting Attacks
A method for thwarting attacks is prevention.
According to Schneier [Sch00], a prevention-only
strategy only works if the prevention mechanisms
are perfect; otherwise, someone will find out how
to get around them. Most of the attacks and vul-
nerabilities have been the result of bypassing pre-
vention mechanisms. Given this reality, detection
and response are essential (see also Section 2 for a
discussion of strong prevention mechanisms such as
[BH00]). In this paper, we propose a method based
on detection of misbehavior, followed by a reaction.
We would like to achieve that only good behavior
pay off in terms of service and reasonable power
consumption.
Detection has to trigger a reaction of other nodes
that results in a disadvantage for the malicious
node. We propose that packets of malicious nodes
should, upon detection of the node’s malice, not
be forwarded by normally behaving nodes. If, how-
ever, a node was wrongly accused of being mali-
cious or turns out to be a repenting criminal that
is no longer malicious and has behaved normally
for a certain amount of time, some sort of ‘re-
socialization’ and re-integration into the network
communications should be possible.
With the scheme we present in this paper, it is dis-
advantageous for nodes to behave maliciously; it
is inspired by an example in ecology explained in
Section 3.1.
1.4 Organization of the Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
related work is discussed in Section 2, followed by
a description of the CONFIDANT protocol in Sec-
tion 3. Section 4 gives a first performance evalu-
ation of CONFIDANT, in the case where attacks
are “no forwarding”. Future work is outlined in Sec-
tion 5 and conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Anderson and Stajano [AS99] authenticate users by
‘imprinting’ according to the analogy of ducklings
acknowledging the first moving subject they see as
their mother, but enabling the devices to be im-
printed several times. The imprinting is realized by
accepting a symmetric encryption key from the first
device that sends such a key. They do not address
routing or forwarding, however, user authentication
and authorization are an important prerequisite for
IC/2002/01 3
trust in the network layer also in mobile ad-hoc net-
works.
Zhou and Haas [ZH99] employ asynchronous
threshold security and share refreshing for dis-
tributed certification authorities for key manage-
ment in mobile ad-hoc networks. They take ad-
vantage of inherent redundancies in mobile ad-hoc
networks given by multiple routes to enable diver-
sity coding, allowing for byzantine failures given
by several corrupted nodes or collusions. The ap-
proach is a potentially strong prevention mecha-
nism, however, to the best of our knowledge, the
impact on the network and security performance
have not been published.
Smith, Murthy and Garcia-Luna-Aceves
[SMGLA97] examined the routing security of
distance vector protocols in general and developed
countermeasures for vulnerabilities by protecting
both routing messages and routing updates. They
propose sequence numbers and digital signatures
for both routing messages and updates and includ-
ing predecessor information in routing updates.
Digital signatures have also been suggested for the
OSPF routing protocol by Murphy and Badger
[MB96]. It remains to be investigated whether and
how digital signatures can be employed in mobile
ad-hoc networks. The CONFIDANT protocol also
addresses routing misbehavior but in addition
gives strong incentives for correct forwarding.
Buttya´n and Hubaux proposed incentives to co-
operate by means of so-called nuglets [BH00] that
serve as a per-hop payment in every packet or coun-
ters [BH01] in a secure module in each node to en-
courage forwarding. One of their findings is that
increased cooperation is beneficial not only for the
entire network but also for individual nodes, which
conforms to our results. The main differences to the
CONFIDANT protocol are that nuglets or counters
are limited to a one-to-one interaction, whereas in
the CONFIDANT protocol misbehavior results in
bad reputation propagating to more than one node
and that the CONFIDANT protocol addresses ad-
ditional issues in the network layer such as traffic
diversion. The question of a tamper-proof security
module remains controversial [PPSW97], but might
prove to be inevitable. As opposed to nuglets and
counters, the CONFIDANT protocol does not need
tamper-proof hardware for itself, since a malicious
node does neither know the entries of its reputa-
tion in other nodes nor does it have access to all
other nodes for potential modification. The secure
module might still be necessary for complementary
protection such as authentication.
Marti, Giuli, Lai and Baker [MGLB00] observed in-
creased throughput in mobile ad-hoc networks by
complementing DSR with a watchdog (for detec-
tion of malicious behavior) and a ‘pathrater’ (for
trust management and routing policy, every path
used is rated), which enable nodes to avoid mali-
cious nodes in their routes. Their approach does not
punish malicious nodes that do not cooperate, but
rather relieves them of the burden of forwarding for
others, whereas their messages are forwarded with-
out complaint. This way, the malicious nodes are
rewarded, and reinforced in their behavior. In con-
trast, with our protocol we would like to achieve
the opposite.
The SAR (Security-aware Ad-hoc Routing) proto-
col by Yi, Naldburg and Kravets [YNK01] modifies
AODV to include security metrics for path com-
putation and selection. They define trust levels ac-
cording to organizational hierarchies with a shared
key for each level, so that nodes can state their secu-
rity requirements when requesting a route and only
nodes that meet these requirements (trust level,
metrics) participate in the routing. Questions not
addressed by this protocol yet include the mecha-
nism for key distribution, knowledge of the keys of
the other nodes, what happens when a node leaves
the group with the shared trust level and how trust
hierarchies are defined in the first place, especially
in civilian applications. SAR relies on tamper-proof
hardware.
3 When Nodes Bear Grudges:
The CONFIDANT Protocol
We now describe the protocol. First we give the
rationale and explain how it finds its root in an
ecological analogy. Then we describe the compo-
nents of CONFIDANT, assumed to be present in
every node. Lastly, we describe the protocol with
free text and a finite state machine.
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3.1 The Selfish Gene: from birds to
network nodes
As explained by Richard Dawkins in ‘The Selfish
Gene’ [Daw76], reciprocal altruism is beneficial for
every ecological system when favors are granted si-
multaneously, so there is an intrinsic motivation for
cooperation because of instant gratification. The
benefit of behaving well is not so obvious in the
case where there is a delay between granting a fa-
vor and the repayment. This is the case when, in
mobile ad-hoc networks, nodes forward on behalf of
each other. An ecological example used by Dawkins
[Daw76] explains the survival chances (and thus
gene selection) of birds grooming parasites off each
other’s head, which they cannot clean themselves.
Dawkins divides birds into two types: ‘suckers’ that
always help and ‘cheats’ that have other birds
groom parasites off their head but fail to return
the favor. In this system, clearly the cheats have
an advantage over the suckers, but both are driven
to extinction over time. Dawkins then introduces a
third kind of bird, the ‘grudger’ that starts out be-
ing helpful to every bird, but bears a grudge against
those birds that do not return the favor and subse-
quently no longer grooms their heads.
According to Dawkins, simulation has shown that
when starting with a majority population of cheats
and marginal groups of both suckers and grudgers,
the grudgers win over time. Winning is defined as
having the greatest benefit, assuming a cost for
grooming another bird’s head and a profit for hav-
ing one’s head groomed, with a loss leading to
extinction and profit leading to multiplication of
the species. The rationale is as follows: the suck-
ers do favors more than they get because of the
large number of cheats, so the number of suckers
decreases, whereas the number of cheats increases.
The grudgers also suffer from some loss, but less
than the suckers. Once the suckers are extinct, the
grudgers grow rapidly at the expense of the cheats,
because they do not help a cheat twice and cheats
are also not helped by other cheats. After a while,
the number of cheats decreases more slowly, be-
cause the probability of a first-help by a grudger in-
creases with a higher population of grudgers. Over
all, the population of the grudgers grows, whereas
the other species become extinct.
Defining suitable cost and profit to routing and for-
warding favors and keeping a history of experiences
with non cooperating nodes achieve the same as
the grudger species, i.e., driving the cheats out of
business. In a very large ad-hoc network, conver-
gence can be very slow, and keeping a history of
all bad experiences with other nodes equals large
storage requirements and long lists to go through.
Therefore, we propose the following ideas, which
are incorporated in the CONFIDANT protocol ex-
plained in the next section, to speed up the triumph
of grudger nodes:
o learn from observed behavior: employ ‘neigh-
borhood watch’ to be warned by observing
what happens to other nodes in the neighbor-
hood, before having to make a bad experience
oneself,
o learn from reported behavior: share informa-
tion of experienced malicious behavior with
friends and learn from them.
3.2 CONFIDANT Components
CONFIDANT consists of the following compo-
nents, as shown in Figure 1: The Monitor,
the Reputation System, the Path Manager,
and the Trust Manager. The components are
present in every node.
3.2.1 The Monitor (Neighborhood Watch)
In a wireless networking environment, the nodes
most likely to detect non-compliant ‘criminal’ be-
havior are the nodes in the vicinity of the criminal
and in some cases the source and the destination, if
they detect unusual behavior or do not get proper
responses. The latter is not always the case, for in-
stance in the case of replay. One approach to pro-
tocol enforcement and detection of damaging be-
havior (intrusion, misuse of cooperation incentives,
denial of service, etc.) suggested here is the equiva-
lent of a ‘neighborhood watch’, where nodes locally
look for deviating nodes.
The nodes of the neighborhood watch can detect
deviations by the next node on the source route by
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either listening to the transmission of the next node
or by observing route protocol behavior. By keeping
a copy of a packet while listening to the transmis-
sion of the next node, any content change can also
be detected. All misbehaviors listed in Section 1.2
can be indicated. However, in the GloMoSim simu-
lations, used for this report, only “no forwarding”
attacks are implemented.
As a component within each node, the monitor reg-
isters these deviations from normal behavior. As
soon as a given bad behavior occurs, the reputa-
tion system is called.
3.2.2 The Trust Manager
In an ad-hoc environment, trust management has
to be distributed and adaptive [BFL96]. This com-
ponent deals with incoming and outgoing ALARM
messages.
ALARM messages are sent by the trust manager
of a node to warn others of malicious nodes. Out-
going ALARMS are generated by the node itself
after having experienced, observed, or received a re-
port of malicious behavior. The recipients of these
ALARM messages are so-called friends, which are
administered in a friends list. How to win friends
in a mobile ad-hoc network dynamically is still on
our research agenda, however, for the moment we
consider friends to be configured in a way similar
to device imprinting as described by Anderson and
Stajano [AS99] on a user-to-user basis.
Incoming ALARMs originate from either outside
friends or other nodes, so the source of an ALARM
has to be checked for trustworthiness before trig-
gering a reaction, thus there is a filtering of in-
coming ALARM messages according to the trust
level of the reporting node. A mechanism similar
to the trust management in Pretty Good Privacy
(PGP) for key validation and certification is used
here for mobile ad-hoc networks for trust manage-
ment for routing and forwarding. In PGP [Zim93],
several levels of trust can be expressed, e.g. ‘un-
known’, ‘none’, ‘marginal’, and ‘complete’. When
PGP calculates the validity of a public key, it ex-
amines the trust level of all the attached certifying
signatures. It computes a weighted score of valid-
ity. For example, two marginally trusted signatures
might be deemed credible as one completely trusted
signature. The weighting scheme is adjustable so
that it can require a different number of marginally
trusted signatures to judge a key as valid. We use
the same principle but for the purpose of determin-
ing whether there is sufficient trusted evidence for
the misbehavior of a node.
The trust manager consists of the following compo-
nents.
o An alarm table containing information about
received alarms.
o A trust table managing trust levels for nodes
to determine the trustworthiness of an alarm.
o A friends list containing all friends a node po-
tentially sends alarms to.
For routing and forwarding, trust is important
when making a decision about
o providing or accepting routing information,
o accepting a node as part of a route, and
o taking part in a route originated by some other
node.
3.2.3 The Reputation System (Node Rat-
ing)
Reputation systems are used in some online auc-
tioning systems. They provide a means of obtaining
a quality rating of participants of transactions by
having both the buyer and the seller give each other
feedback on how their activities were perceived and
evaluated. For a detailed explanation of reputation
systems see Resnick et al. [RZFK00].
To avoid a centralized rating, local rating lists
and/or black lists are maintained at each node and
potentially exchanged with friends. In the route re-
quest nodes can include that black sheep be avoided
for routing, which also alarms nodes along the way.
Nodes can look up senders in the black list contain-
ing the nodes with bad rating before forwarding
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anything for them. The problem of how to distin-
guish alleged from proven malicious nodes, i.e. how
to avoid false accusations, can be lessened by time-
out and subsequent recovery or revocation lists of
nodes that have behaved well for a specified period
of time. Another problem is scalability and how to
avoid blown-up lists, which can also be addressed
by timeouts.
The reputation system in this protocol manages a
table consisting of entries for nodes and their rat-
ing. The rating is changed only when there is suf-
ficient evidence of malicious behavior that is sig-
nificant for a node and that has occurred a num-
ber of times exceeding a threshold to rule out co-
incidences. The rating is then changed according
to a rate function that assigns different weights to
the type of behavior detection, namely the greatest
weight for own experience, a smaller weight for ob-
servations in the neighborhood and an even smaller
weight to reported experience. The rationale for
this weighting scheme is that nodes trust their own
experiences and observations more than those of
other nodes.
Once the weight has been determined, the entry of
the node that misbehaved is changed accordingly.
If the rating of a node in the table has deterio-
rated so much as to fall out of a tolerable range, the
path manager is called for action. Bearing in mind
that malicious behavior will ideally be the excep-
tion rather than the norm, the reputation system
is built on negative experience rather than posi-
tive impressions. The issues of positive change and
timeout are still to be addressed in detail.
3.2.4 The Path Manager
The path manager performs the following func-
tions:
o Path re-ranking according to security metric,
e.g. reputation of the nodes in the path.
o Deletion of paths containing malicious nodes.
o Action on receiving a request for a route from
a malicious node (e.g. ignore, do not send any
reply).
o Action on receiving request for a route con-
taining a malicious node in the source route
(e.g. ignore, alert the source).
3.3 Protocol Description
Trust Manager
Path Manager
Reputation System
ALARM   received
enough evidence
tolerance exceeded
event     detected
significant   event
trusted
below threshold
within tolerance
threshold  exceeded
not  enough   evidence
not significant
monitoring
managing pathrating
updating event
count
evaluating 
alarm
updating
ALARM table
sending
ALARM
evaluating
trust
initial state
Monitor
not trusted
Figure 1: Trust architecture and finite state ma-
chine within each node.
As shown in Figure 1, each node monitors the be-
havior of its next hop-neighbors. If a suspicious
event is detected, the information is given to the
reputation system. If the event is significant for the
node, it is checked whether the event has occurred
more often than a predefined threshold that is high
enough to distinguish deliberate malicious behavior
from simple coincidences such as collisions. What
constitutes the significance rating can be defined
for different types of nodes according to their se-
curity requirements. If that occurrence threshold is
exceeded, the reputation system updates the rat-
ing of the node that caused that event. If the rat-
ing turns out to be intolerable, the information is
relayed to the path manager, which proceeds to
delete all routes containing the intolerable node
from the path cache. The node continues to moni-
tor the neighborhood, and an ALARM message is
sent as described in the following:
In order to convey warning information, an
ALARM message is sent by the trust manager com-
ponent. This message contains the type of proto-
col violation, the number of occurrences observed,
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whether the message was self-originated by the
sender, the address of the reporting node, the ad-
dress of the observed node, and the destination ad-
dress (either the source of the route or the address
of a friend that might be interested). In the present
simulation implementation, the ALARM is sent to
the source of the concerned route.
When the monitor component of a node receives
such an ALARM message, it passes it on to the
trust manager, where the source of the message is
evaluated. If the source is at least partially trusted,
the table containing the ALARMs is updated. If
there is sufficient evidence that the node reported
in the ALARM is malicious, the information is sent
to the reputation system where it is again evalu-
ated for significance, number of occurrences and
accumulated reputation of the node as explained
in Section 3.2.3. Sufficient evidence means that ei-
ther the source of the ALARM is fully trusted or
that several partially trusted nodes have reported
the same and their respective assigned trust adds
up to a value of one entirely trusted node or more.
4 Performance Analysis
4.1 Goal
The objective of this performance analysis is to de-
termine the impact of the CONFIDANT routing
protocol extensions on metrics as described in Sec-
tion 4.2 in an ad-hoc network where a part of the
population acts maliciously. The regular DSR pro-
tocol is used as a reference. For all these metrics,
we want to investigate the scalability in terms of
number of nodes, fraction of malicious nodes, and
mobility.
For future work, our goal is also to learn how
protocol parameters such as thresholds should be
set. Given these parameters we will determine how
many friends per benign node are needed to toler-
ate a given percentage of malicious nodes.
4.2 Metrics
The following metrics are considered.
Throughput, Goodput, Dropped Packets.
One metric is the resulting total goodput
G of a network with n nodes, i.e. the data
forwarded to the correct destination. We
express this as:
G =
∑n
i=1 Originated∑n
i=1 Received
(1)
As opposed to the throughput, packet loss
and retransmissions are taken into account.
The goodput is directly influenced by packet
loss. Packet loss can occur due to general net-
work conditions causing link errors or unreach-
able nodes, but packets can also be lost be-
cause an intermediate node intentionally drops
them. The latter is the only form of packet
loss directly attributable to malicious behav-
ior. We therefore use the number of intention-
ally dropped packets as a metric, both in ab-
solute numbers and relative to the number of
packets originated.
Overhead. Since the cost of internal computation
in terms of energy consumption is negligible
compared to the cost of a transmission, we look
at the overhead caused by extra messages and
define the total overhead O in a network of n
nodes as follows. We consider each transmis-
sion tx of a control message, not only origina-
tion or reception.
O =
∑n
i=1 ALARMtx∑n
i=1 RREQtx + RREPtx + ERRORtx
(2)
We use this ratio to determine how much
extra overhead the CONFIDANT extensions
cause relative to the regular routing over-
head. The overhead that can be clearly at-
tributed to the CONFIDANT extensions are
the ALARM messages transmitted. ROUTE-
REQUEST, ROUTE-REPLY and ERROR
messages in the case of DSR or, to be more
general, any messages needed for rerouting de-
pend on the underlying routing protocol. The
CONFIDANT protocol points out the identity
of misbehaving nodes and allows the routing
protocol to reroute around them.
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Profit. We try to determine whether cooperation
pays off for a node. One metric that directly
reflects a cost-benefit trade-off is the ratio of
how many of the transmissions of a node are
originated or received by the node itself versus
how many are just forwarded as an interme-
diate node on behalf of other nodes. Thus we
look at the ratio of originated to transmitted
packets. Assuming a cost cf of forwarding a
packet (composed of power, CPU usage, mem-
ory usage) and a benefit br when receiving a
packet as a destination or bs when having an
own packet received by the destination, we de-
fine the profit p of a node as
p = br
∑
Packetsreceived
+ bs
∑
Packetssent successfully
− cf
∑
Packetstransmitted, (3)
The total profit P for the network of n nodes
is denoted by:
P =
n∑
i=1
pi (4)
4.3 Simulation Setup
For the performance analysis of the protocol ex-
tensions, the metrics are observed in various net-
work scenarios given by different modifications of
the DSR protocol. The first network we analyze is
a regular well-behaved DSR network which is used
as a reference.
We then introduce compromised nodes that do not
cooperate. These malicious nodes do not forward
messages for other nodes. The next kind of net-
work we use for analysis is a network containing a
certain fraction of malicious nodes but no defense
mechanism, we call it ‘defenseless’.
Then we use a version of DSR that we enhanced
with CONFIDANT extensions and refer to it as
‘fortified’. The first enhancement towards a forti-
fied network is the reaction of a node on its own
bad experience. If a node notices that its next-
hop neighbor does not forward, it will avoid that
node for future communications. The second en-
hancement is to include the case when the neigh-
bor node fails to forward a packet for some other
node and it is detected. The third enhancement is
given by warnings (ALARM messages) sent to the
source by friends that observe that a node is behav-
ing maliciously. To take this one step further, nodes
can use the information contained in ALARM mes-
sages that they overhear promiscuously, irrespec-
tive of whether they are the actual destination of
the message, i.e., the source of the compromised
route or a friend. In the simulation, every benign
node is a friend of the source and informs the source
when packets are maliciously dropped by the next
hop. This represents an almost ideal case given the
presence of malicious nodes, except that nodes in
this implementation do not propagate ALARMs to
friends other than the source. Future performance
analysis will determine the number of friends ac-
tually needed to sufficiently limit the influence of
malicious nodes.
Out of the variety of routing and forwarding at-
tacks on DSR found in [BB02] , we concentrate on
forwarding defection for this performance analysis,
because it can be detected easily and its impact on
network performance can be measured.
The simulation is implemented on GloMoSim
[ZBG98], a simulator for mobile ad-hoc networks.
Unless otherwise specified, the experiments were re-
peated ten times with varying random seed. The
seed influences the placement and movement of the
nodes. Whenever confidence intervals are shown in
plots, the confidence level on these intervals is 95 %.
The fixed parameters for the simulation are listed
in Table 1. The radio range, sending capacity and
MAC have been chosen to represent an off-the-shelf
device, the speed is uniformly distributed between
0 and 20 m/s to offer a range of users that are
in a fixed location, walking, or driving a car; the
chosen area approximately represents the center of
a town. The simulation time is chosen to be long
enough to potentially roam the whole area. The mo-
bility model chosen is the Random Waypoint Model,
in which nodes move to a random destination at
a speed uniformly distributed between 0 m/s and
IC/2002/01 9
Parameter Level
Area 1000 m × 1000 m
Speed uniformly distributed
between 0 and 20 m/s
Radio Range 250 m
Placement uniform
Movement random waypoint model
MAC 802.11
Sending capacity 2 Mbps
Application CBR
Packet size 64 B
Simulation time 900 s
Table 1: Fixed Parameters
a specified maximum speed. Once they reach this
destination, they stay there for as long as specified
in the pause time parameter. The reason for this
movement model is to have a random movement
with pauses with the aim to reflect realistic user
behavior. The placement has been chosen to start
with a good network connectivity over the whole
area. Finally, CBR has been chosen for traffic (we
refer to it as applications) to avoid protocol par-
ticularities of more complicated protocols such as
TCP. The application is defined as follows. A client
constantly sends to a server which in turn responds
to the client. The client-server-pairs have been ran-
domly generated for the simulation.
The factors varied are the total number of nodes
in the network, the percentage of malicious nodes,
the pause time and the number of applications. The
rationale for the choice of these factors is given in
Section 4.5.
4.4 Simulation Results
Figure 2 shows the mean number of packets
dropped, varying the pause times and the network
size, i.e. the number of nodes, but keeping the frac-
tion of malicious nodes fixed at a third of the total
population. At any time during the simulation 10
CBR-connections are active. In the defenseless net-
work, the number of packets intentionally dropped
is up to two orders of magnitude greater than in the
network fortified by CONFIDANT. The results are
0.1
1
10
100
1000
10000
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
m
ea
n 
nu
m
be
r o
f p
ac
ke
ts
 d
ro
pp
ed
pause time (s)
fortified, 50 nodes, 15 malicious
defenseless, 50 nodes, 15 malicious
fortified, 20 nodes,  6 malicious
defenseless, 20 nodes,  6 malicious
fortified, 10 nodes,  3 malicious
defenseless, 10 nodes,  3 malicious
Figure 2: Mean number of packets dropped versus
pause time.
fairly constant with respect to mobility, only de-
creasing slightly in the case of an almost static net-
work at a pause time of 900 s. The fortified network
is a little more sensitive to mobility. This can be
explained by the increased probability of meeting
a previously unknown malicious node when nodes
move around more. For future work, in order to de-
termine convergence of the protocol, it will be in-
teresting to see the distribution of dropped packets
over the time of the simulation to the point when
the nodes have met many other nodes already and
judged their reputation.
When looking at the number of packets dropped
from a network-size perspective, it can be seen
from Figure 3 that the difference in performance
increases with the total number of nodes in the
network. The fortified network keeps the number of
dropped packets fairly constant irrespective of the
network size, whereas the defenseless network dete-
riorates significantly with increasing total number
of nodes.
In Figure 4, the confidence intervals are shown for
the mean ratio of number of packets dropped to
packets originated. The analyzed network consists
of 50 nodes and the number of applications was
increased to 30 in order to observe the behavior
in a more heavily loaded network. DSR fortified
with CONFIDANT extensions loses only a small
fraction of packets (always less than 3%) because of
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Figure 3: Mean number of packets dropped versus
number of nodes, one third is malicious.
malicious nodes, whereas regular, defenseless DSR
faces a loss of a significant number (around 70%) of
the packets, all other parameters being equal. The
defenseless network does not benefit from a more
static network, as opposed to the fortified network.
Figure 5 shows how the CONFIDANT protocol
copes with a varying percentage of malicious nodes
in the total network population. The pause time is
set to 0 to stress the CONFIDANT protocol with a
very dynamic network, where it cannot use the ad-
vantage of improving with more stability which it
showed in the previous figures. The number of ap-
plications is equally deliberately set as high as 30
for increased load. It can be seen that in a defense-
less network, already a small percentage of mali-
cious nodes can wreak havoc. There is not much
difference in the number of intentionally dropped
packets as the percentage of malicious nodes in-
creases. This can be explained by the fact that it
does not matter where on the path a packet is
lost. The network fortified with CONFIDANT is
more sensitive to the percentage of malicious nodes,
however, it still keeps the number of deliberately
dropped packets low even in a very hostile envi-
ronment as given by more than half the population
acting maliciously - given that there are enough
nodes to provide harmless alternate partial paths
around malicious nodes.
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Figure 4: Number of packets dropped per number of
packets originated by 30 applications, 20 simulation
runs.
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Figure 5: Number of packets dropped, 50 nodes, 30
applications, 0 pause time, varying percentage of
malicious nodes
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20 simulation runs.
In comparing the ratio of packets sent and received
in Figure 6, the performance of the fortified net-
work in which a third of the population behaving
maliciously is very close to that of a regular benign
DSR network without malicious nodes. The reason
that the ratio is below 100 % even in a benign net-
work is that losses are not only due to malicious
nodes dropping packets but also to link errors or
because nodes have moved away too quickly for the
protocol to catch up.
The goodput versus the percentage of malicious
nodes is depicted in Figure 7. The network is again
highly mobile with a pause time of 0 s, which ex-
plains the goodput of only about 80% even for a
network containing no malicious nodes. The forti-
fied network keeps this performance up in the pres-
ence of up to 40% malicious nodes and deteriorates
only slightly in the presence of up to 60% malicious
nodes. With 90% or more malicious nodes finally,
the fortified network cannot improve the perfor-
mance anymore. The fact that even in a population
of only malicious nodes there is still a goodput of
about 20% can be explained by a portion of the
communication happening between nodes that are
within each others radio range.
Figure 8 shows the throuphput of clients and
servers according to the CBR applications used.
Clients send at a constant bit rate of 2 Mbits,
the servers respond according to the packets they
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Figure 7: Goodput, 50 nodes, 30 applications, 0
pause time, varying percentage of malicious nodes.
receive. The fortified version is not very close to
the benign network, but it can also take advantage
of longer pause times, i.e., a less mobile network,
whereas the performance of the defenseless version
remains unacceptable.
Figure 9 shows the ratio of ALARM messages in
the total number of control messages transmitted.
It is always lower than 3%, although factors cho-
sen, namely ‘number of nodes’, ‘number of applica-
tions’ and ‘fraction of malicious nodes’, are at their
maximum according to Table 2, thus presenting the
least favorable case in these simulation boundaries.
It is also an upper bound given the parameters and
factors of this simulation in that the threshold for
sending an ALARM after having detected a for-
warding failure is set to 1, i.e., every maliciously
dropped packet detected is reported by an ALARM
message.
4.5 Estimation of Factor Relevance
In order to find out which factors actually have an
effect on the performance metrics and to reduce the
number of experiments, a 2kr factorial design ac-
cording to Jain [Jai91] was performed, with k (the
number of factors) being set to 3 and 5, r (the num-
ber of repetitions of the experiment) set to 10, re-
sulting in 8 and 32 experiments or 80 and 320 simu-
lation runs, respectively. Table 2 shows the factors
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Figure 9: Mean overhead caused by the CONFI-
DANT protocol, 20 simulation runs
and the two extreme levels that were chosen for the
experiments.
Factor Level 1 Level 2
Number of nodes 10 50
Protocol defenseless fortified
DSR CONFIDANT
Pause time 0 s 600 s
Percentage of 0.00% 33.33%
malicious nodes
Number of 10 30
applications
Table 2: Levels for factorial design
The choice for the number of nodes was made with
the intention to show both a very small network
that still allows for multiple paths and reasonable
network connectivity given the area and a larger
network to get insights on scalability. The pause
times were chosen to reflect a very mobile network
as well as a very moderately mobile one given that
the duration of the simulation is 900 s. The extreme
levels for the percentage of malicious nodes in the
network population are motivated by the desire to
show the behavior of a network with a very high
but probably still manageable fraction of malicious
nodes. This should then be compared to a totally
benign network situation. The number of applica-
tions, i.e. ongoing CBR connections, were chosen
bearing in mind both the capacity of nodes as well
as scalability.
Table 3 shows the variation due to three factors,
with a constant setting of one third of the network
population being malicious nodes and 10 applica-
tions taking place in the network. It shows that the
protocol, whether defenseless or fortified, has the
greatest impact on the number of dropped packets
in the presence of malicious nodes, which confirms
the intuitive expectation. What is more surprising,
is to see that the pause time alone, i.e., the dy-
namicity of the networks has very little influence
relative to the other factors. With the exception of
the combination of the protocol (which caused the
most variation by itself) and the pause time (which
had the smallest contribution to the variation by it-
self), all the combinations contribute significantly
to the variation, which should not be neglected in
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the analysis. Although the percentage of malicious
nodes has been kept at the constant of one third,
the number of nodes also contributed significantly
to the variation and was present in all the combi-
nations that mattered.
Factor Metric:
dropped
packets
A (Number of nodes) 9.97 %
B (Protocol) 60.78 %
C (Pause time) 1.17 %
AB 9.39 %
AC 10.11 %
BC 0.73 %
ABC 7.85 %
T (Total) 100.00 %
Table 3: Variation due to three factors and their
combinations, 10 applications, one third malicious
nodes
The results in absolute numbers of dropped packets
are listed in Table 4. The experiments are shown
with their combination of factors used according to
Table 3.
Combination dropped packets
A10BfC0 30.83
A10BdC0 551.67
A10BfC600 58.67
A10BdC600 1309.00
A50BfC0 118.83
A50BdC0 2836.00
A50BfC600 5.50
A50BdC600 1354.00
Table 4: Mean number of dropped packets for each
experiment with ten runs
Table 5 shows the variations in the number of
dropped packets due to five factors and relevant
combinations. The combinations of factors are not
listed if their individual contribution to the vari-
ance turned out to be negligible. In these 25r ex-
periments, the protocol state does not have as much
influence on the variance as in the 23r experiments.
This can be explained by the fact that the num-
ber of packets dropped in a fortified network in the
presence of one third malicious nodes is only on the
order of tens or hundreds, whereas in a defenseless
network thousands of packets are dropped. The for-
tified network behaves almost as well as a benign
network, thereby levelling the difference. Again, the
pause time only contributes an almost negligible
share to the variation relative to the other fac-
tors. As can be expected the number of malicious
nodes is responsible for a significant portion of the
variation, when varied between zero and one third.
Prominent among other combinations, which also
contribute, the combination of the protocol and the
number of malicious nodes causes quite a significant
portion of the variance.
Factor Metric:
dropped
packets
A (Number of nodes) 4.97%
B (Protocol) 15.17%
C (Pause time) 0.07%
D (Percentage of malicious) 17.68%
E (Number of Applications) 5.00%
AB 4.97%
AD 4.81%
BC 5%
BD 16.17%
CD 4.78%
ABD 4.81%
BCD 4.78%
Table 5: Variation due to five factors and relevant
combinations
5 Future Work
The next step is to investigate the behavior of the
CONFIDANT protocol over time, i.e., considering
transient removal and convergence, to determine
whether the performance converges and when.
Regarding the simulation implementation, we are
currently working on enhancements such as a lim-
ited number of friends, timeouts for reputations,
and different thresholds for events that are used to
infer the malicious character of nodes. The thresh-
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olds directly impact the tolerance of the node’s rep-
utation. The next step will be to extend the im-
plementation to observable attacks other than for-
warding defection, e.g. route diversion.
For the CONFIDANT protocol itself, of interest
are, for example, methods to efficiently distribute
reputation information in order to avoid malicious
nodes as early as possible.
The CONFIDANT protocol assumes that nodes are
authenticated and that no node can pretend to be
another in order to get rid of a bad reputation.
Some mechanisms to ensure that are being inves-
tigated, e.g. those mentioned in Section 2. Future
work will be to evaluate and incorporate suitable
solutions in the CONFIDANT protocol.
6 Conclusions
Mobile ad-hoc networks exhibit new vulnerabili-
ties to malicious attacks or denial of cooperation.
When designing protocols for these networks, spe-
cial care has to be taken to include fairness mech-
anisms for the increased requirements in this en-
vironment. New ways of distributing trust can be
implemented by introducing the notion of friends
and making cooperation pay off. This paper rec-
ognizes the special requirements of mobile ad-hoc
network in terms of cooperation, robustness, and
fairness, and analyzes the performance of a scheme
to cope with them by retaliating for malicious be-
havior and warning affiliated nodes to avoid bad
experiences. Nodes learn not only from their own
experience, but also from observing the neighbor-
hood and from the experience of their friends.
Observable attacks on forwarding and routing
can be thwarted by the suggested CONFIDANT
scheme of detection, alerting and reaction. Perfor-
mance analysis by means of simulation shows a sig-
nificant improvement in terms of goodput when
DSR is fortified with the CONFIDANT proto-
col extensions. The overhead for this increase is
very low. The CONFIDANT protocol is scalable
in terms of the total number of nodes in a network
and performs well even with a fraction of malicious
nodes as high as 60%.
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